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Abstract
The concept of efficiency is developed as it applies to higher
education. As to whether or not there is overinvestment in higher
education, the evidence presented indicates a recovery in the social
rate of return since the mid- '70s, and high returns since 1946 rela-
tive to total returns to housing or to financial (bond) assets.
Efficiencies are explored as they relate to the internationally
somewhat unique U.S. emphasis on university-based user-driven
research, use of part time RAs and TAs , college placement offices, and
financing shared with families able to pay. Inefficiencies are also
explores, such as sources of considerable excess capacity, high-cost
low-output curricula, and rare use of cost/effectiveness analysis in
budgeting.
The overall international competitiveness of U.S. higher education
is considered, together with means of improving its efficiency,
thereby providing the resources and the enhanced external support for
increasing quality and access.

IFmproving Higher Education Through
Increased Efficiency
Walter W. McMahon
Increased efficiency is one means of sustaining and improving
quality and access. Increasing either quality or diversity at given
levels of efficiency requires additional resources. So especially in
the anticipated periods of budget stringency, there is need to focus
on the third element in the uneasy triangle of quality, diversity, and
efficiency. Should total resources for higher education grow signifi-
cantly in real terras, it nevertheless continues to be in the best
interest of universities and colleges to use resources efficiently to
the best possible advantage, and thereby maintain their com-
petitiveness.
Approximately 32 billion dollars in additional Federal budget cuts
will be required in each coming year to meet the Gramm-Rudraan Federal
budget deficit reduction targets. This situation as has been stressed
by Terry Hartle (1988) and Arthur Hauptman (1988) will result in con-
tinuing pressure to limit increases in Federal support of higher edu-
cation, R&D, and Federal support for state-operated programs such as
Medicaid, which in turn reduces the capacity of states to respond to
the needs of higher education. There is a broad concern with the
slowdown in productivity growth in the United States, and some aware-
ness of the relevance of investment in education at all levels as well
as in R&D in order to reverse these trends. But even though there is
likely to be less conflict between the Bush Administration and the
Congress on education issues than there was during the preceding
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Administration, the reluctance to introduce changes in taxes suggests
that the budget facts are likely to remain grim. But beyond this,
Congress and state legislators want efficiency in the use of their tax
dollars, just as parents want efficiency in the use of their tuition
dollars. So seeking to improve quality as well as access by improving
efficiency will continue to be a viable strategy. Delivering better
quality and at the same time maintaining or improving access or diver-
sity for the given amounts of resources that are available helps col-
leges and universities to avoid waste and related sources of criticism
and, through improved competitiveness positions them well to obtain
additional support.
Efficiency is a difficult concept however for many in higher edu-
cation. It is often because it is misinterpreted to be limited to
only internal budget reallocation. The latter inevitably makes some-
one "worse off," which leads to opposition and to disputes about what
constitutes quality. The result is that efficiency decisions are
either delegated to Vice Chancellors of Academic Affairs, or effi-
ciency is merely ignored, or both.
Arthur Hauptman (1988) defines efficiency as the financial effi-
ciency with which a particular Federal student aid or research reim-
bursement program is administered within its own pre-determined goals.
Although this is one aspect of efficiency, concept of efficiency in
economics is considerably broader than that, in ways that will be
addressed in this paper. One can share his concern that the Federal
student Pell grant programs are tending to be less targeted on the
truly needy, although in the broader context of efficiency this would
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be thought of instead as a reduction in vertical equity. Arthur
Hauptman's concern with excessive indirect cost charges by univer-
sities for research is an inefficiency in the system, especially if
its source is a monopoly rent charged by some universities under the
label of (padded) cost-based reimbursement for performance of the
overhead functions. Finally, the faster tuition increases by higher
education institutions in those periods when state financial support
is particularly tight are regarded by Hauptman as perverse and inef-
ficient. The problem with this is that it ignores the devastating
effects on the internal inefficiency of universities of off-again on-
again financing. This efficiency loss must be weighed against the
effects of irregular rates of increase over time in tuition rates used
by colleges and universities as a means of stabilizing their revenues.
In what follows, this paper will consider efficiency in higher
education more broadly, including
1. The Concept of Efficiency
,
or the internal and external
efficiency of institutions as well as efficient investment
strategies
,
2. The Efficiency of U.S. Higher Education
,
an evaluation of the
trends in the social rates of return and some indicators of
the relative efficiency of U.S. higher education compared to
that in other countries, and
3. Remaining Potential Sources for Improvement in Efficiency .
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I. The Concept
Efficiency often is ignored because it either is not understood
very well, or because it is defined too narrowly to mean only internal
budget reallocations accompanied by cuts.
But the broader concepts of Pareto efficiency and of efficiency
in a dynamic context need not involve budget cuts , or leaving anyone
"worse off." Specifically "Pareto moves" in a college or university
budgeting environment involve finding those changes that increase
efficiency, and thereby make some students or some programs "better
off" without making anyone "worse off." Such moves therefore ob-
viously require unanimous consent, a very tough standard. Although,
unanimous consent is sometimes possible in budget committees and pro-
gram decisions, it is too demanding to be possible to achieve in all
situations. The alternative is to arrange by various means to compen-
sate those who are adversely affected. Since this compensation prin-
ciple results in no one being left "worse off," it reduces to the
Pareto criterion. The Pareto criterion can be viewed as kind of a
minimal ethical principle, but from an efficiency perspective it is
also a means (hopefully at minimum cost) of reducing conflict, and of
facilitating change that otherwise could not occur.
Means of providing for compensation that are less costly and
therefore frequently used include allowing the budget cuts that may be
necessary as part of reallocations to be handled through attrition.
A second important means is by personnel reassignment, seen as a fre-
quent (and often quite successful) practice when academic adminis-
trators or some tenured faculty change roles. A third means is the
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common use of a "grandfather clause," as when current students are not
hit with new curriculum requirements but are instead expected only to
meet the requirements printed in the catalogue as of the date they
entered the program. Sometimes outright financial compensation is
paid, as in the case of early retirements.
Finally, and most important, in a dynamic context over time, an
efficiency-increasing investment strategy merely increases those bud-
get lines more rapidly where the efficiency gain is the greatest, and
increases all other budget lines more slowly. The economic criteria
that is needed to implement this efficient investment strategy in-
volves making some estimate of the expected benefits in relation to
the costs, or where possible, the social rate of return to the invest-
ment (which is a benefit/cost ratio). It is far less important and
sometimes quite impossible to make a precise numerical estimate of the
benefits and costs than it is to approach each budget decision with
some qualitative judgment of the prospective effectiveness or benefits
in relation to the cost of the investment if an efficient investment
strategy is to be achieved.
Expenditures on higher education are in fact an investment in
human capital formation. They yield returns later in the form of
higher earnings throughout the life cycle, and also higher productiv-
ity of the individuals involved to the extent that earnings reflect
the individual's true productivity. The appropriate measure of the
efficiency gain or benefit/cost criterion, under these conditions is
the social rate of return. It includes all of the cost to the society
of the investment, including the tuition and foregone earnings
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(roughly room and board) costs to the family as well as the social
costs to the taxpayers and donors who support the institution. The
social rate of return is that pure internal rate of return that dis-
counts the stream of earnings before taxes expected over the life
cycle of each graduate back to its present value and sets it equal to
the total private and social costs.
An efficient investment strategy therefore is not a one time event
decided upon by a special budget committee or a task force. It is a
continuing process of annual and more frequent iterations, increasing i
investment by larger percentage amounts where the social rate of re-
turn is highest and increasing it more slowly or not at all where the
potential efficiency gain is negligible.
II. The Efficiency of U.S. Higher Education
Whether or not the U.S. is overinvesting or underinvesting in
higher education as a whole depends primarily on the level and the
trend of the social rate of return to higher education in relation to
the investment alternatives. After considering this, an evaluation of
the efficiency of some of the major features of U.S. higher education
will be offered in comparison to the structure of comparable institu-
tions elsewhere in the world.
Is the U.S. Overinvesting in Higher Education ?
The evidence is that the real social rate of return to investment
in higher education in the U.S. has remained at a relatively high and
steady approximately 11 percent rate of return since 1939. There was
a dip in the 1973-79 period as the large wave of baby boomers were
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assimilated into the labor market, as was noted in McMahon and Geske
(1982, p. 161), by Finis Welch, and others. But this was temporary,
and the relatively stable 11 percent real rates of return held up in
spite of the huge influx of college-educated veterans entering the
labor force in 1950-55 as the result of the GI Bill, the dramatic
expansion of community colleges in the 1960s, and the expansion of
Federal student grant and loan programs following the Education
Amendments of 1972.
The reason that the social rates of return have not fallen, and
that diminishing returns to higher education has not set in, is that
the demand for college graduates simultaneously increased. It is also
a necessary element that the internal efficiency of the higher educa-
tion system cannot have declined substantially, or these rates of re-
turn over cost could hardly have remained stable. But the demand for
graduates continues to grow in part because it is known that as tech-
nical change occurs , educated workers hold a comparative advantage in
the workplace in implementing the new technology (see Bartel and
Lichtenberg, 1985).
Relative to the alternative uses of investment funds, this approx-
imately 11 percent rate of return to investment in human capital is
shown in Figure 1 in relation to recent carefully done calculations by
Ed Mills (1988) of the real rate of return to investment in housing
capital, and to investment in non-housing fixed capital. The returns
to human capital come out about in the middle. They are somewhat
below the 15 percent or so real returns to non-housing capital, and
significantly above the average 5 percent returns to housing capital.
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both of which are calculated to include capital gains . By this
measure there is underinvestment in non-housing physical capital, and
i significant overinvestment in housing in the U.S., but the rate of
investment in higher education (being in the middle) is about right.
We will return to this last point in a moment, but the temporary
decline in the returns to higher education in the period between 1973
and 1981 deserves closer attention. Richard Freeman (1976) noted this
decline in his book The Overeducated Americans , but did not develop
its temporary nature. The U.S. fertility rates peaked in 1957 at 3.77
children per family, leading to a large cohort of college graduates
entering the labor market and depressing the mean earnings of college
graduates in the 25-34 age group relative to the earnings of high
school graduates from the 1.27-1.33 range in 1967-72 to a trough of
1.15 in 1974 as seen in Table 1. This same wave of baby boomers bid
up housing prices and capital gains on housing as noted by Ed Mills
(see Figure 1). But then the relative earnings of college graduates
recovered to their previous level of 1.32 by 1981, and has even risen
above that since then to 1.46 and 1.51 by 1985 and 1986. In terras of
rates of return, Elchanan Cohn and Woodrow Hughes (1988) controlling
for the extent to which college graduates differ in significant re-
spects from non-college graduates find that the real rate of return
declined to a low of 6 percent in 1978, but then started to recover
by 1982 (e.g., Cohn, 1988). For purposes of rate of return calcula-
tions, the earnings in the older 35-44 age ranges are also relevant.
As can be seen in Table 1 these also showed a dip, but only a tem-
porary one in 1980-82. This ratio of college to high school earnings
-10-
Table 1
Ratio of Mean Income of College to High School Graduates
All Males Year
Ages 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
25-34 1.33 1.32 1.33 1.33 1.27 1.22 1.19 1.15 1.19
35-44 1.53 1.47 1.58 1.54 1.55 1.55 1.52 1.55 1.56
All Males Year
Ages 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
25-34 1.26 1.21 1.24 1.22 1.27 1.32 1.40 1.41 1.35
35-44 1.55 1.48 1.47 1.52 1.48 1.42 1.42 1.48 1.47
All Males Year
Ages 1985 1986 1987
25-34 1.46 1.51 N.A.
35-44 1.54 1.57 1.54*
*The 1987 figure is for median income from CPR, Series P-60, No. 181,
"Advance Data from the March 1988 Survey." For comparability of 1987
to 1986, the median in 1986 (1.57) is the same as the mean (1.57) for
the 35-44 age group.
.
Source: Current Population Reports , Series P-60, Money Income of ||
Families and Persons in the U.S. , U.S. Bureau of the Census,
June 1988 (for 1986 data) and earlier issues.
I
I
^I
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in the 35-44 age range recovered to its long time average of 1.54 by
1985, and appears to be holding steady in the 1.54 to 1.57 range in
1986 and 1987, This comparative advantage in the earnings available
to college graduates relative to high school graduates in the somewhat
older age ranges is an important factor stabilizing the social rates
of return to higher education.
Returning to the level of the real returns to various types of
investment, the overinvestment in housing may be due to the large tax
advantages especially to owner-occupied housing and the easier access
to housing credit than to credit to finance investment in human
capital or in non-housing fixed capital and financial assets. The
real returns on non-equity financial assets that carry somewhat less
risk is also lower. The 1989 long term AA corporate bond rate is 10
percent, for example, and the prime rate is 9.1 percent. When
corrected for the current inflation rate of 4.9 percent, these result
in real rates of return of 5.1 percent and 4.2 percent respectively
(see Data Resources Incorporated, 1988, p. 1), which are considerably
below the returns to investment in human capital. Furthermore, these
returns to investment in human capital are far more stable than the
returns to investment in financial assets (see McMahon and Geske,
1982, p. 161). The greater volatility of returns to housing capital
has been noted by Ed Mills (1988) and can be seen in Figure 1.
What evidence there is therefore with respect to the level, trend,
and relative stability of the returns to higher education does not
suggest that there is overinvestment. Instead there may be modest
-12-
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underinvestment in human capital (and in non-housing fixed capital)
relative to the rate of investment in housing and in bonds.
Implications for the U.S. Saving Rate
The saving rate as conventionally measured is low in the U.S. by
international standards, and there is great concern to learn how it
can be increased. A new light is shed on this however when it is
recognized that total saving, using the standard definition of saving
as refraining from consumption, includes the amounts provided by
parents as they restrict their consumption to pay college tuition,
room, and board for their children. Total investment, similarly, in-
cludes these savings being invested in human capital formation.
The interesting point is that as public subsidies financed through
taxation (which restrict consumption) encourage families to invest
more in education than they might otherwise, the parents are encour-
aged to restrict their consumption even more to finance the total edu-
cational investment being made. Total savings and total investment is
thereby increased. It is unlikely that as much would have been saved
by the parents if the child had left home and gone to work after high
school. The emotional attachment of the parent to the child, the con-
cern for his or her future, and the public (tax and expenditure)
encouragement to this instinct is a powerful force encouraging saving
and investment toward the future.
The question is certain to be raised, since it has been of late,
about whether especially Federal, but also state grant, loan, and
subsidy programs are effective in inducing increased enrollments (and
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hence saving and investment in human capital by families). The
questions have usually been raised however by studies that do not con-
|p trol adequately for other effects on enrollment. When such controls
are enforced, the effects of these programs are much more apparent.
For example, there was a 13 percent decline in the number of high
school graduates nationwide between 1979 and 1984. The anticipated
decline in college and university enrollments however did not occur.
According to C. Frances (1984, p. 3), "enrollments grew between 1979
and 1984 by about 6%."
This is not surprising when one examines the highly significant
positive effects on the amounts families decide to invest as the
result of public Federal, state, and local subsidies after controlling
for other effects. In the simultaneous equation results reported in
Table 2, based on a sample of 5,200 individual students and their
families, and after controlling for these other effects, these grant
and subsidy programs are highly significant. That is. Table 2
controls for the reduction in the number of high school graduates by
reporting the results not in aggre-gate terms but on a per family, or
per capita basis. The effect of ability. A, on the investment to be
made is taken into account, although it is not significant. The
effect of the mother's education (S„) and father's education (Sp) is
controlled for, as is sex and race (by sorting the sample), as well as
\ other things including the parents' income (as reported by the parent
with his or her signature that it could be checked by access to IRS
forms). The result was that Pell grant and tuition subsidies, S, turn
out to be very highly significant (t = 6.42 to 20.35), as are publicly
-14-
Table 2
DETERMINANTS OF INVESTMENT IN EDUCATION BY FAMILIES
(Three-stage least squares; t-statistics in parentheses)
i
A. Males (Whites only)
Demand: I, = -62r* + .04A + 2.66Sm +
.97Sf - 2.36m - 1.06N, - 2.55N2
(14.92) (.48) (3.49) (1.26) (1.36) (1.31) (2.21)
+ .9ON3 - 3.45N4 - I.6ON5 - 4.13N« + 3.74N7 + .30
(.82) (2.07) (1.74) (3.97) (4.57) (11.65)
.43Y + .004S + .62L - .25B - .73W - .130 +Supply: I, = -4.44r + .27
(6-27) (21.82) (6.42) (23.18) (4.62) (45.41) (10.97) (22.33) 1
B. Females (Whites only)
Demand: I, = -19r* + .19A + .47Sm +
.29Sf - 1.19^ - .18N, + 1.24Ni
(6.71) (4.42) (1.21) (.74) (1.52) (.42) (2.07)
- .57N3 - .89N4 + .5IN5 - 1.12N« + .97N7 + .11
(1.02) (.83) (.74) (2.62) (2.30) (6.15)
Supply: I, =
-2.01r + .25Y + .0055 + .37L -
(5.57) (21.79) (20.35) (20.08)
.16B - .62
W
(5.71) (31.47)
1.930 + 7.54
(2.79) (10.79)
Investment demand,
I = I(r*, A, Sm, Sp, fi, N, N,),
I = planned investment in college. The number of years of
education planned by the student and his family (e.g.,
two-year associate degree, bachelor's, master's, M.D.,
Ph.D., etc.) was multiplied by the expected costs per year.
The latter were the sum of tuition and fees, reduced by
the tax subsidies and endowrtnent hind subsidies to
tuition, scholarships, and foregone earnings costs.
r* = the expected rate of return. A pure interned rate of return
to the planned degree program computed for each student
by iterative methods. It equates the student's expected
eanxings over his or her life cycle (analyzed in McMahon
and Wagner, 1981) to the family's total private investment
costs as defined above by I. This is a private expected
rate of return of the type relevant to private household
investment decisions, which is developed further in
McMahon and Wagner (1982) and McMahon (forthcom-
ing).
A = ability, as measured by the ACT composite test score used
for college admissions. Greater ability could be expected
to increase the expected rate of return and hence shift
the demand function upward as among different families.
Sm = schooling of the mother. The hypothesis is that home
investments in children, when the mother has more
education, raises the IQ or ability of the child (see
Liebowitz, 1974) and also, especially if the mother has
been to college, shifts the utility function toward greater
farsightedness. Both imply larger investment in education.
Sf = schooling of the father, analogous to S^.
M = degree of uncertainty. This was measured by asking the
student to estimate his or her degree of uncertainty about
future earnings on a scale from to 1.
Ns = expected nonmonetary returns from education — the
contributing of education to greater efficiency in house-
hold production of satisfactions (defined in more detail
when relevant below).
Y =
S =
L =
B =
W =
O =
the supply-of-funds schedule
I = r(r, Y, S, L, B, W, O),
the rate of interest on student loans. In the rare instance t
the family borrows in the nonsubsidized, nonguaranteed Id
market to support human capital formation, r is the mar
rate of interest available to them
family disposable income, including ezirrungs of the stud«
collected from parents and students separately in the surv
tax subsidies and endowment ftmd subsidies to tuition, f,
scholarship aid received from zdl sources,
student locuis — the amount available to middle- or lovi
income families, based on a meems test, guaranteed by'
federal government, and available at a subsidized rate,
the number of brothers and sisters at home or in school. 1
is a limiting factor on the availability of family financial supp,
work time spent in the market by the student, withdr^
from hours of study or leisure.
order of birth— a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the stuc
is the first-bom. The hypothesis is that the first-born mal(
some families (especially black families) is expected to I
support the family, so that foregone earnings are less avail*
for the support of further education.
i
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supported student loans, L (t = 20.08 to 23.18). These key deter-
minants of why families save and invest are the same for black fema-
les, but somewhat different for black males (McMahon 1976, p. 322).
For grants (S), t = 6.04 for black females and t = 5.69 for black
males, whereas for loans, t = 10.71 for black females and t = 10.65
for black males in terms of the effect of these policies on the deci-
sion to save and investment. This sug-gests that in spite of the
decline in the number of high school graduates from 1979 to 1984, and
in spite of the 1980-82 recession and its effects on parental income.
Federal as well as state student financial aids were a stabilizing
factor for investment by both blacks and whites.
A reasonable conclusion to reach, based on this evidence which
controls for other effects, is that Federal (and state) support is
effective in inducing higher rates of saving and investment in higher
education by families.
International Comparisons of Efficiency in Higher Education
This evidence of efficiency indicated by a satisfactory rate of
return and by the effectiveness of public policy in encouraging total
saving and total investment is put in broader perspective by con-
sidering the relative competitiveness of the U.S. higher education
system in relation to others.
Research at Institutions of Higher Education . Some institutions
have major research functions, whereas others have almost entirely
undergraduate teaching functions. Most current research at all of
these types of universities, however, is separately funded by the
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Federal government or by donors on a project-by-project , user-driven,
peer-group-review basis. There are exceptions, of course, and some
relatively small state and private university sources of funds are
provided to help younger faculty get started and to keep teaching
faculty in departments where there is little outside support (e.g.,
humanities) up to date. But apart from this, research time is
financed by faculty who buy their time away from teaching, reimbursing
their departments for time not spent teaching by separately funded
outside-user driven objective-focused research grants.
The characteristics of this system in the United States, in con-
trast to the way it operates in many other countries, is that the re-
search is largely user-driver , based on peer-group review in the
attempt to insure its scientific merit, and integrated with graduate
instruction . The procedures connected with each of these three basic
characteristics are not perfect. But consider the alternatives.
Basic research in many other countries is concentrated in separate
research institutes, rather than in the universities. These insti-
tutes are manned by salaried staff, engaged in research that is not
supported by the users of the output. The output often therefore sits
on the shelf, and the research enterprise is less externally efficient.
Integration of the research with graduate instruction also is
somewhat unique. By these means, the new technology gets transferred
much more quickly as part-time graduate research assistants finish
their programs and enter industry or other employments. In contrast,
full-time, aging professional research assistants who are not graduate
degree candidates are used in most British universities and some other
1
1
li
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countries . Although the quality of the research is often excellent
from the point of view of its economic efficiency, it often does not
f get applied and used in industry or in public administrative prac-
tices. This practice also makes graduate education more expensive,
since the graduate students do not have the part-time support, and
graduate education is therefore less accessible and less widespread.
In some places this separation of research institutes into separate
cocoons is carried to logical extremes. In Pakistan, for example, the
PSIR labs are well financed for a poor country but are quite inac-
cessible to easy use by graduate students and faculty in what are
often adjacent universities. The research output of these PSIR labs
is not user driven, often sits on the shelf, and has a short half-
life. The semi-isolation of these institutes is also common in
Indonesia, France, the USSR, and other places that are on the European
pattern.
This lack of user-driven, peer-group-review research integrated
with part-time graduate student support results in an externally
inefficient system that is internally so costly that it cannot be
maintained except at the cost of inefficient slower economic growth
and much more limited access to graduate education.
Instruction of Undergraduates . Graduate student teaching assis-
Jtants who assist with the instruction of freshmen and sophomores at
L most universities are in a role that is very similar to that of
apprentices or of interns who assist physicians. The practice is not
going to change, because it is far less costly. It is sometimes
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abused, and has recently been regarded by one critic as a "scam." But
consider the alternatives.
The use of full-time faculty who are not engaged in research part-
time frequently results in faculty that are out of date (as is common
in Pakistan, some of Latin America, and in Indonesia for example) so
that graduate students in these places must go abroad. The system for
this additional reason is so costly that access must be severely
limited. Graduate student instructors in American universities are
less experienced, as are interns, but they are in training, supervised
by senior faculty, closer to the age of the undergraduates, and able
to transmit the new technology being discussed in their graduate semi-
nars to undergraduates much more swiftly.
The practice is sometimes abused. Some graduate teaching
assistants, especially in the physical sciences, are unable to com-
municate well in English. Others do not work out for others reasons.
But more departments are developing more organized training sessions
for first-time teachers. Even in the absence of this, the less effec-
tive teaching assistants are normally weeded out, but only after a
semester or a year. The alternative of using fulltime faculty at
these beginning levels as is the practice throughout Africa, Asia, and
some parts of Europe runs the cost of the instruction of under-
graduates up so high that it results in a far smaller proportion of
the population able to gain access to higher education than in the
U.S.
External Efficiency . The activities of job placement offices
located in virtually every college in the highly decentralized U.S.
I
>I
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higher education system are in sharp contrast to the practice in
developing countries and some European countries where placement is
not viewed as a responsibility of the universities and greater
reliance is placed on a centralized manpower planning system. U.S.
college placement offices channel students quite effectively to those
fields and those industries where the need for their services is
greatest. They also send a flow of information backward to students
in the pipeline who are well aware of where the opportunities lie and
of expected salary levels (see McMahon and Wagner, 1981). Students
tend to vote with their feet, gravitating to the fields and the educa-
tion levels where the returns are highest, as Freeman (1971) found
earlier. Admission standards rise in those curricula that are in
highest demand as a non-price rationing device, and then the budget
money within universities gradually begins to be shifted, but with
long lags. It is a highly decentralized system that does respond to
local and occupational price signals, albeit sluggishly, and it
appears to be reasonably externally efficient in this respect compared
to most other countries.
There is a time dimension to the response that needs to be recog-
nized however. For example, at the University of Illinois, 95 percent
of the students in Engineering have jobs before they receive their
diplomas. Only 54.25 percent of the Liberal Arts students do. But
follow-up surveys find that when reinterviewed six months after grad-
uation, 96.47 percent of these Liberal Arts graduates have jobs (see
McMahon, 1987, p. 183). Furthermore, the age-earnings profiles of
general education graduates tend to be steeper as learning on the job
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continues to occur (see McMahon and Geske, 1982, p. 173). Although
this does not always apply to teachers and to those social and natural
sciences that are dominated by public pay scales, the rates of return |
to many liberal arts and general education fields often are as high
when this time delay in employment, steeper ageearnings profile, and
lower educational costs are all taken into account (see McMahon,
1988b).
Financing . In relation to higher education financing patterns
throughout Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America, parents and stu-
dents in the United States pay a larger fraction of the total tuition,
room, and board costs. The Federal student aid programs although per-
haps not adequately targeted on those most in need are nevertheless
much more equitably targeted than is the pattern throughout the
developing countries and some parts of Europe.
Expansion of higher education in the U.S. to a larger percent of
the population therefore is probably made possible not only by in-
ternal efficiencies that hold costs down (use of RAs and TAs , lower
room and board costs for local community colleges), and by higher
family income but also by these financing arrangements that utilize
parental contributions where the capacity exists and conserve student
aid funds for use where there is need and where enrollment is
affected.
It is unfortunate that the lack of efficiencies in the higher edu-
cation systems in developing countries, such as those discussed,
result in relatively high unit costs, and the failure to use adequate
methods of appraising financial need also limits the resources II
iI
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available to finance access and quality. The weakness of the third
pillar in the uneasy triangle, efficiency, pulls the props out from
under the first two pillars, quality and access.
III. Potentials for Improvement
Although the U.S. higher education system appears to have many
basic features that are conducive to its internal and external effi-
ciency that make it quite competitive and a major foreign exchange
earner, there is always room for improvement. A few sources of
internal inefficiency can be mentioned that merit further investiga-
tion.
1 . There is an increase in the amount of time it takes to com-
plete a bachelor*s degree . In a recent study sponsored by NCES
(1988) of high school graduates in 1980, it is found that full-time
students entering college directly after high school are taking 4.5
years on the average to complete a 4.0 year bachelor's degree now.
There are also many more part-time students, so if they are included,
this trend is even more dramatic. The average load per year of "full-
time students" (those with 12 semester hours per semester and up) also
appears to be falling; this is certainly true if part-time students
are included in the average.
There are some hypotheses about the cause of this that merit
further investigation, for it surely is a source of internal ineffi-
ciency. In some developing countries and in France where students are
much more highly subsidized than in the U.S. there is less incentive
to finish expeditiously. It is not much comfort to us that it takes
-22-
61/2 years to finish a 4 year bachelor's degree in Indonesia, 6 years in
Nepal, and about that long in Malawi. Efforts to limit the large sub-
sidies going to the sons and daughters of the highest income families
and to reform the system in other ways led to major student protests
in France and in Nepal recently, protests that also found support
among influential parents.
In the U.S. parents and students pay a larger percent of the cost
and the problem is not as severe. But since the late 60s drop rules
in the U.S. became very lax at many universities, which encourages
course shopping at the beginning of each semester. This operates to
keep the average course load down, closer to the minimum of 12
semester hours each semester, and also to encourage dropping back to
part-time enrollment to get tuition refunds. This has the effect of
keeping opening fall enrollments up. But it would appear to be a
source of growing internal inefficiency.
2, A second problem is related sources of excess capacity on
campuses that run up costs unnecessarily . For example , the number of
students in class before Thanksgiving or Spring break, and the number
of regularly scheduled classes that actually operate before vacations
have all fallen dramatically in sharp contrast to when there used to
be double cut rules. Very few faculty take attendance anymore (and
those that do probably do so at their own peril on the CEQs).
Although Saturday morning and evening classes were common until the
late 1960s, now the average class attendance of undergraduates on
Fridays is very low.
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This absenteeism is likely to be a serious source of internal
inefficiency since education and learning research repeatedly shows
that student achievement (after controlling for other things) is
heavily influenced by the student's time-on-task. (See, for example,
the survey by Bruce Fuller, 1987, pp. 283-5). It is also evident that
these and related practices generate excess capacity. Many courses
are closed at registration time in popular or in mainline curricula
because of capacity constraints, with many students turned away. Yet
the course shopping that is permitted results in classrooms that are
perhaps only two-thirds full later, and the lack of use of courses by
students before vacations and on Fridays reduces utilization further.
The resulting excess capacity both in underutilized classroom space
and underutilized faculty time perhaps raises the cost of higher edu-
ation one-third over what it would otherwise be.
3. A third source of internal inefficiency are the number of
courses allowed to go forward with very few students. This is not
indefinitely, to be sure. But for one or two semesters, and usually
at the Masters or Ph.D. level, there are many courses with one or two
or three students that are counted as part of faculty teaching loads
rather than being dropped on the first day of each semester and re-
offered later. This practice is always defended on some basis. But,
it is very costly.
4. Fourth, there is normally reluctance to make a serious commit-
ment to doing cost effectiveness analysis in university budget
offices . It is necessary to seek out sources of internal and external
inefficiency, and this takes study.
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For example, the cost effectiveness of some degree programs is
very low—often because of a very small output and lack of a critical
mass. Others, including some that on the surface might be though to
be very costly, are very cost effective. In Britain the University
Grants Commission has established uniform cost accounting categories
among institutions that has made it possible to see this pattern
clearly across institutions much more clearly (see Donald Verry,
1976). Although comparisons across institutions are more difficult in
the U.S., there are some possibilities (e.g., the unique statewide
Illinois Unit Cost Study). Within institutions, a Ph.D. dissertation
by James Dyal (1975) found that among 72 academic departments, the
benefit/cost ratios at the Ph.D. level were highest in the Chemistry
and Chemical Sciences departments. They were much lower in some
fields in Agriculture for example where the output was only one or two
Ph.D.s a year or in Veterinary Medicine where the output was small. A
later study by McMahon (1979) included the research output of each
department, as well as a weighted measure of undergraduate and gra-
duate instructional units, and a similar pattern emerged. Some of the
departments or colleges that might appear on the surface to be the
highest cost, such as the College of Law and the Chemistry Department
turned out however to be the most cost effective. The humanities.
Psychology, Economics, History, Math, Library Sciences, and Business
Administration were all cost effective compared to the all-campus
average. Engineering, Physical Sciences, and Life Sciences were at
the all-campus average, and the smaller and/or more costly programs in
the Medical Sciences, Veterinary Medicine, Labor and Industrial
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Relations , and Dairy Science were far less cost effective. The
Aviation program was so cost ineffective that compared to the all-
campus average it was off the map, but something has since been done
about that. The Chemistry Department, incidentally, which has a large
output of Ph.D.s every year and makes very extensive use of teaching
assistants in the beginning courses has one of the lowest costs per
instructional unit of any college level department in the state.
The basic point is that what is or what is not cost effective is
not always apparent on the surface. To improve cost effectiveness re-
quires a continuing search, and in large organizations, a commitment
to do the necessary analyses before making decisions.
5. Allocative Efficiency Between Public and Private Institutions .
The State Student Incentive Grant Program (SSIG) provides the Federal
government with a policy lever to correct the allocation between pub-
lic and private institutions whenever the need to do so exists. The
fact that Federal grants to state scholarship funds has not been used
extensively may only mean that the survival of large numbers of pri-
vate colleges has not been in serious jeopardy, and not that this tool
is useless and should be abolished.
State scholarships in many states cover only tuition, and not also
room and board as do the Pell Grants. This is not true in all states.
Nevertheless, since the tuition at private institutions is con-
siderably higher, and since these state scholarship grants give more
students the freedom to choose private institutions, a larger percen-
tage of these funds wind up as aid to private colleges and uni-
versities. Perhaps the reason that SSIGs have not been used more
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extenslvely to correct the allocation is the rule of thumb "If it
isn't broken, don't fix it." But the author does not believe in
destroying centers of excellence. If the survival of good quality
private colleges should every be in jeopardy, it would be desirable to
keep SSIG's available for more extensive use.
IV. Conclusions
The evidence cited suggests that higher education in the United
States measures up pretty well on grounds of economic efficiency. One
cannot say the same for U.S. secondary education, or for the top-heavy
higher education systems in some other countries. But the evidence is
that the real social rate of return to investment in higher education
remains reasonably high at 11 percent, which is high in relation to
the return on housing or the real rate of return on bonds. It is also
reasonably stable and therefore less risky. Although there was a tem-
porary dip from 1973 through 1982, the returns have recovered and
there is therefore no evidence of a secular decline. Furthermore, the
public encouragement to families to invest in education induces pri-
vate saving, and therefore probably increases the nation's total
saving and total investment rates when these are defined to include
human capital accumulation.
There are several major sources of internal efficiency that help
to make the U.S. higher education system efficient and internationally
quite competitive that are discussed above. They include emphasis on
university-based user-driven research, the economically efficient use
of part-time graduate student intern teachers, externally efficient
<
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decentralized placement, the sharing of financing with those parents
that have the ability to pay, and faculty who are not full-time
teachers but who are also involved with the development of the new
technology. International students flock to U.S. higher education; it
is a major foreign exchange earner, and the undergraduate enrollment
ratios as a percent of each age group are the highest in the world.
Nevertheless, the time it takes to finish a four year bachelor's
degree is increasing, the average semester-hour load of students is
falling, the internal excess capacity and the unit costs are rising,
the high cost low output curricula that have not reached a critical
mass are plentiful, and administrative leaders are not very well
informed or concerned about the internal sources of cost-
ineffectiveness •
All of us are concerned by the long run secular slowdown in pro-
ductivity and per capita economic growth in the United States. The
higher educational system with its capacities for high quality basic
research, for the transmission of the results to industry and to the
next generation, and for high quality instruction, all within a rela-
tively efficient and equitable structure, is a major asset. The more
higher education chooses to get its house in order, and improve
further its internal and external efficiency, the more it puts itself
in a position to benefit, and the more it puts itself in a position to
help the nation.
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